Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 19bd3df06f35497d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.1 KB
MD5: 5cf9438d0cce7f1a7d70b73dcce5f210 SHA-1: 513aa59f966126edfd9140ea30b3126784310c82 SHA-256: 19bd3df06f35497ddc090fc8b39b26769614d1ee1efc0833197b87e020cc1a80
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor, indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. The presence of `equAtIOn.3` as a ProgID strongly suggests this vulnerability is being leveraged for arbitrary code execution. No document body text was available for further context, but the heuristics alone point to a classic exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001603.bin
606b17887ae2c79f4ef60618a1572d11abcf4f7d687227f5d47edb7961aba553
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1603 1955 bytes