Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 19ae655449139a82…

MALICIOUS

RTF

57.2 KB First seen: 2023-09-07
MD5: 302822808680b13287d8d8942ee6dc0c SHA-1: 13cb523640a3cbd414445a212f1495bd2772b9d8 SHA-256: 19ae655449139a82f523d6c649b61d238db3cf6e4453c0a7deb2cb8caa540b64
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic for macro-based malware. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly suggests exploitation of this component to facilitate further malicious activity, likely payload delivery.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a91.bin
e69ec317fe0456afae9be23734383efe8100b0dbe80ca42c0ed417efd94fa717
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A91 1838 bytes