Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 197edec0eabc4254…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

26.3 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 14.0300
MD5: e820003e7e04dbdb775d5fa04955a81d SHA-1: b16adc616fa2b62b96441bfbbaa56226f4105b48 SHA-256: 197edec0eabc4254a08b45b383d355c2db0fc04918b73cc2c3473ebd9a9394ab
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains Excel 4.0 macros, identified by the OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET heuristic. These macros utilize WinAPI functions like URLDownloadToFileA and ShellExecuteA, as indicated by OOXML_XLM_BINARY_WINAPI_STRINGS, to download a payload from the URLs https://absolutefitnessgym.com/ and https://absolutefitnessgym.com/ds/3.gif. The OOXML_XLM_REASSEMBLED_PAYLOAD and OOXML_XLM_CELL_ARRAY_URL heuristics confirm the reconstruction of these URLs from the macro code, suggesting an attempt to execute a malicious second-stage file.

Heuristics 5

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
  • Binary XLM macro sheet with WinAPI/download strings critical OOXML_XLM_BINARY_WINAPI_STRINGS
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet is stored as BIFF12/XLSB binary data and contains Win32 download or process-execution API strings such as URLDownloadToFileA, ShellExecuteA, or CreateDirectoryA. These strings are high-signal in XLM macro sheets and catch payload-download macros that XML-formula scanners cannot parse.
  • XLM payload reassembled from CHAR()/split formulas critical OOXML_XLM_REASSEMBLED_PAYLOAD
    An Excel 4.0 macro sheet builds its payload inside the formula token stream by concatenating per-character CHAR() calls and string fragments, so no WinAPI name, shell command, or URL is ever contiguous in the .bin for a literal-bytes scan to find. Reassembling the formulas recovered download/execute API names, LOLBin commands (regsvr32/rundll32/mshta/wmic/powershell), or a payload URL — the de-obfuscated download-and-run kill chain.
  • URL reconstructed from XLM cell array (2 URLs) critical OOXML_XLM_CELL_ARRAY_URL
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet stages its payload URL across individual numeric cells (one ASCII charcode per cell) or inside an embedded HTA that uses VBScript Chr()/&-concat obfuscation. The reconstructed URL is invisible to literal-bytes URL extraction because it is never contiguous in the workbook stream. URLs were recovered by walking the BIFF12 record stream of every worksheet and macrosheet part and decoding RK/inline-string cells in both row-major and column-major order.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://absolutefitnessgym.com/
    • https://absolutefitnessgym.com/ds/3.gif

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_sheet_00.bin
33b39070cf703fb8920ce299136e91bbc3d2e0dae01e819c4b64ba4e4c896109		 xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin 200463 bytes

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