Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 19460adcc751028d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.4 KB Created: 2021-06-15 13:17:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: 5a1c90749f027eae841075b68b81061e SHA-1: fdaf441841edacb6a04dcfd37eb46337c809583f SHA-256: 19460adcc751028d42a5470140be7faf1d543303a7d5c64659cc8ccf0cf4762e
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

This PDF file was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, specifically as a phishing attempt. The document contains numerous links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites or disposable hosting, designed to appear as a download for Windows 7 Ultimate. The primary lure URL is https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=windows+7+ultimate+iso+activated, which impersonates Microsoft. The presence of multiple link farms and the overall structure suggest a campaign to distribute malware or harvest credentials.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=windows+7+ultimate+iso+activated.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=windows+7+ultimate+iso+activated PDF link annotation
    • http://safeabortionnepal.com/userfiles/file/43529270969.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://evocative.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a459839b3f8---vupibap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://discoveryenglish.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c97d04c044---63657423959.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://blackknowledge.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f092ea94deef56e1fcb8ad969ab70408/nukeladasezinewagim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://donkaew-furniture.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gojokabobowugud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bikinibody.be/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/aehv2u6q4mish150eo8bjtkkd0/57119350001.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://studiogreenwich.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/076a465791de9a9158dcffc244f7f68f/29920180861.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agilitynd.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b4dcbcdfaba08cd78f507e7d70dfda04/gufotiti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bilagroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bd7c65e297a---pigutat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.abaco-engineering.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160887d3e03a94---guliwadusebu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://training-solutions.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160702373e926b---xatotuvut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.phonefixcomo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606e52512e5dd---dezitaxixunafejakize.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://assurancemauricie.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096f6b4e0439---41964580065.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.naturapreserved.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d445b26426---9109043041.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e3f3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3F3 5232 bytes
SHA-256: 825de6e79a9879238f230b7b03751cdc8e2a6283a5df5111fe0b373fbe4fe428
font_01_sfnt_off0000f5d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5D2 10992 bytes
SHA-256: 1718f7f4e05751021c1e8c0271b913803e7ec32d55d6b9c1a6d8c63103c52e8f

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.