Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 192c127cfb5e8ba5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

215.5 KB Created: 2000-04-13 21:48:14 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 608d89a9afafdce353965d9ee16bd433 SHA-1: 054131aafa87bdd7a624a39a2ff6161bdf29ced1 SHA-256: 192c127cfb5e8ba572cda74b035db1b7cceaff14b218bac1dfd75f8e85fca5b5
418 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

This XLSX file contains a Workbook_Open VBA macro designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to achieve this, and the embedded URLs suggest a lure related to invoices or payments. The obfuscated nature of the script and the appended payload indicate a high likelihood of malicious intent.

Heuristics 12

  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 220,672 bytes but its declared streams total only 106,851 bytes — 113,821 bytes (52%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://limarija-das.hr/wp-conte
    • https://steijnborg.mobilitum.com/wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/templa�
    • https://ar5E*f#teecaligrafia.com.br/image5E*f#ns/fotos/thumbs/MupJ4cZzxoElmn.php
    • https://limarija-das.hr/wp-content/plugins/wp-optimize/js/handlebars/CJrMovjhM.php@OoG)o;W|jz
    • https://steijnborg.mobilitum.com/wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/content/WjovFkpG3.phpAPyJL
    • https://blog.bitz.pe/wp-content/plugins/wpforms-lite/vendor/goodby/csv/src/Goodby/CSV/Import/Protocol/Exception/M7yde0cw.phpQOjdAH+H|M
    • https://ahd_O$Bn
    • https://courieradmin.pheG&Eo
    • https://sierraimoveis.com.br/manager/boweY1O46qlr_components/bootstrap/lessY1O46ql/mixins/BpZbPd8mY0.php
    • https://fitzgeraldstreet.com/ap-photos/themes/modus/css/fontello/1j5yZLSi4VE.phpc/5NT5j
    • https://tricommanagement.H4t9ioH4t9irg/fonts/H4t9ifont-awesome-4.7.H4t9i0/css/zhk1GWeH4t9idvcwJJJ.php

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
46ce9d54261d0263d73bc85176dddce4eba762ef57062a0cd772bc2d38b5f7b2
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15272 bytes