equation editor exploit — RTF malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 19272f8c9954490f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.2 KB First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 3c39b43392310a57abbe05f4f2ce04b8 SHA-1: 582527ab9149331fc79a71d1bbff0c1599227845 SHA-256: 19272f8c9954490fe2d808c8892c23779cbf0b4c1b467d99165ce2540f357078
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

equation editor exploit · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability within Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit is known to allow for arbitrary code execution when the document is opened. The presence of the Equation Editor CLSID and the FONT record overflow signature strongly indicate this exploit is being leveraged.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000036.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x36 4148 bytes
SHA-256: 3574732658fe13dc93f92d5fc82c6d0573ad086c7d8f2df5ace2de7bad147a0e