Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 192565ab0ad7d152…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.6 KB Created: 2020-08-22 22:06:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4ca85641ff04c02e0a60fa617fa3fee0 SHA-1: 134dc229e856fce3ab9ff3075f590dc45bc08fba SHA-256: 192565ab0ad7d15238a893b89f69cfbc0258bc59ddfeeb2b65fc17fa315ac536
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a lure to execute commands via clipboard manipulation, indicating an attempt to trick the user into running malicious code. It also hosts a large number of links to external PDFs, with one redirecting to known malicious infrastructure, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution scheme. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=hackintosh+guide+catalina
    • http://lidijavop.ronaldjavorbooks.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814328/juraxovazu-xenoborowolamu-dawizotadotowug.pdf
    • http://files.2019.taiwanpianofestival.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407571/doxev_vunenizefas.pdf
    • http://zamopuxeg.belmenphotography.com.au/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407089/rakizaganugapivuson.pdf
    • http://wedanubu.naturehillsfarm.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407995/2d2679ce9f1.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4556/0226/files/fortinet_firewall_training_guide.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1737/1797/files/nakifidaxubabanu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8664/2338/files/95761327442.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8806/8254/files/bupufuwujotamavoma.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6119/9526/files/contratos_de_alquiler_en_bolivia.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6712/9504/files/3516714556.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2376/0536/files/89921680380.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8073/6165/files/8005084017.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/4146/2174/files/nisexuxu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3812/9823/files/65434751725.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1703/4134/files/51107109741.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000a22e.bin
5571f56d6a3b3dd89ca520db849c52bef487210438a5720ff9e9c2e912ee0dbf		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA22E 5132 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000b389.bin
4673df62f83c90a4a8b175f4a29f68dd27e8b155ac9c6a456a294eea89c3893f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB389 2236 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000bdb5.bin
95bbcc51eb824a48ae45563f98ebd676f48de1265a6dcf3f8975582057482ed1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBDB5 10212 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0000e0f6.bin
76c58d9dad2553210f58dd276edfbe5dbdf64153339314c97a5850829df6aff1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE0F6 16508 bytes

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