Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1919fe1200745be7…

MALICIOUS

RTF

88.0 KB First seen: 2024-09-23
MD5: 248f534e473f9a51934121421533ecd9 SHA-1: e1c21d1fdc56bea48c7ea14904b2dd37685cf0d5 SHA-256: 1919fe1200745be744006f6644e4b65f27992bc8d28c0f444f1da5162503f708
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_OBJUPDATE and RTF_OBJDATA heuristics indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated and executed, likely to download and run a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-laced documents.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001e83.bin
6e87193d31f433d6fadde31441baf28be21beac9a1ebdbf40891648a19049809
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E83 1581 bytes