Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 18e72f10067e9203…

MALICIOUS

RTF

6.9 KB First seen: 2021-06-13
MD5: 08dd328521ae3457357b43dc1397c35b SHA-1: 18dea5523d00f368205aa0b5647da9bfdc436918 SHA-256: 18e72f10067e9203b96338fc9b68d43898520d092b508386c8b40313d0d06f66
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly suggests that this object is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely downloading and running a second-stage payload. The `RTF_OBJDATA` heuristic confirms the presence of embedded OLE object data.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000ad2.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAD2 1529 bytes
SHA-256: d9ae0d6704eefe9a2464e02bba1c819ecd347578d99d5a8c8dbc5f60d22f4144