MALICIOUS
672
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
This PDF document contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits multiple known vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader, including CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL http://ogzhnsltk.com/plugins/getexe.php. The presence of multiple exploit techniques and the download URL strongly indicate malicious intent.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 17
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Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCHA single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
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PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
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Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KITOne recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
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ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAVClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
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eval() call high PDF_EVALeval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
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unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPEunescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
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Shuffled variable-fragment JavaScript stager high PDF_SHUFFLED_VAR_JOIN_JS_STAGERPDF JavaScript stores an exploit stage as many randomly named string fragments, rebuilds the fragment order through a name array and eval(join('+')), then decodeURIComponent/evals the result. The decoder requires a large variable table and only fires when the recovered stage contains concrete Acrobat exploit JavaScript.
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Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERYBounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
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PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URLDecoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://ogzhnsltk.com/plugins/getexe.php
- http://ogzhnsl
Extracted artifacts 6
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0015_000.jsd4fc705a67fffaf942fd8e9eace04dec6d07e817e41e9d44f5a34f5f09d392ce |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 15 at offset 0x315 | 28557 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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shuffled_var_join_stage_000.jsbb1e20a0a9bee1279009612d8c11ae8fc16672190659579a026796bd8d361a4d |
deobfuscated-js | shuffled variable-fragment join decoded JavaScript object 15 at offset 0x4A34 | 4942 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 7 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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shuffled_var_join_stage_001.js6fd7795ede8680e08a0e6c2f8e43590c717e5a0b1a473a1a3b67d96259cba505 |
deobfuscated-js | shuffled variable-fragment join decoded JavaScript object 15 at offset 0x42AC | 5308 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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shuffled_var_join_stage_002.jsb53d264488fbb8aa25d6a3b56426d1331b7581d4c3fb4fad186d9d093393feca |
deobfuscated-js | shuffled variable-fragment join decoded JavaScript object 15 at offset 0x42AC | 4938 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 7 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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generic_stage_recovery_000.js8edc45ce36037c986cf90e74acb28af5eb4256580cbbbd1b7de48c0507ee02f2 |
deobfuscated-js | generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 15 at offset 0x315 | 26629 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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generic_stage_recovery_001.js8a6584d69b7189c706ed2b68978022e544b52832ab0966143c41c86a1d55cbce |
deobfuscated-js | generic stage recovery percent-decode -> percent-decode from JavaScript object 15 at offset 0x315 | 26627 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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