Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 188230810c10e34c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.5 KB First seen: 2019-02-26
MD5: 0bec8dacaf7575204f4ec877bc2d1939 SHA-1: 915c4862e6921154aac2e50b0a3bc16b05d4cc70 SHA-256: 188230810c10e34cd8bf08654b6c9f6e2b57a7cdcd0b6ee79a20b2fb2e788733
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this OLE object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3B 1745 bytes
SHA-256: 047dcfa13e905dc46ac1252a41886d8490e8a04b07628ad88c9bc640f75beefc