Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 188127e80084599f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.4 KB Created: 2020-08-08 16:46:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 9ee1330494dcc0e1e157f554875d3c9d SHA-1: 5d45807da9f533129465fc901d9c108b79456086 SHA-256: 188127e80084599f9c800a1be8d7247e547f1393d064cc2b3621e94795350f3c
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with one critical heuristic identifying a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be part of this malicious redirection chain. The presence of a 'download button' lure and a clipboard command execution lure further suggests a malicious intent to trick the user into executing further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=vi+commands+in+linux+pdf
    • http://govoruji.alexwanforatlanta.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637814/038383c814af3e.pdf
    • http://files.churchbarmt.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383760/84f00d088d2.pdf
    • http://files.refinedblinds.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874495/9015ed2ce9.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8861/8396/files/akuntansi_pajak_atas_piutang.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1851/0745/files/51745876328.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7008/7587/files/zajizepejerenopubelaj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/6079/6318/files/61089789707.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/5419/3047/files/50491881655.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1121/1425/files/wovuzagomisetijupujazupe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0462/4021/files/lalisevenizazasigajiwe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1557/7504/files/72004468559.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/3974/4419/files/49903643041.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ef23.bin
95d685f1217fbd5c3e0e7bf344bb655e2016f37e336b3b171270032273182663		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF23 5236 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000100f0.bin
e8f68b4acf4a154842982b88dcb3f78283f4a2ff0f622ff2df80cd49fe28f165		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100F0 11768 bytes

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