Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 186a1c7911ec0a41…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.7 KB Created: 2021-06-18 05:22:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6a891ea83fb8eb9f3150d2191a40cc8c SHA-1: 0e9aa5ca0d7c663d8f77617b9ef8fcf3ff7c9da8 SHA-256: 186a1c7911ec0a41e4a9c502be47c2f71b3e96536d9440280c0fe8226f7ac128
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by a machine learning classifier and ClamAV. It contains numerous links pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The presence of these links suggests the document's primary purpose is to lead users to malicious sites, likely for phishing or to download further malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://vansuloi.com/uploads/userfiles/file/bonewimizovuxek.pdf
    • http://inspiredindianfoundation.org/uploads/pelovozamarun.pdf
    • http://barrarioservicos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608910d36cb5a---99488005393.pdf
    • https://afd.me.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/45sa1qnv7ajpalvraig172l0k6/37122714680.pdf
    • http://sarljarry.fr/userfiles/file/ralamomedapefawijiwolovav.pdf
    • https://autotrilogy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/30eaab0195c65328d88c2e96f5fc7c13/51276784881.pdf
    • http://kwik-it.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c7bcb57321---56891210162.pdf
    • http://sinara.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608bb3eb9d2b6---38631940376.pdf
    • http://51www.org/uploadfile/file/2c46d873e9a092c2744138f748308213.pdf
    • http://uniondeautoescuelas.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160826b7aeecfa---9209493651.pdf
    • http://amwordpress.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606ce7a593bd9---retekujevutok.pdf
    • http://www.majoriscambio.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070c8bebe1c1---79452538905.pdf
    • https://prikolnaya.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3c3d1971249f0586581bf7a0d944a369/97691712995.pdf
    • https://www.paparazzirestaurant.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ce9283915c339b15b4f6a9bdeeb42cc3/tomasidil.pdf
    • http://maidnheaven.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c6c233b5ec---95894469232.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=3+ejemplos+de+sistemas+transaccionales
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000112d9.bin
c58a65d6b6d8bcac15349e7028fb7c57ebbcd2728cee5eb87ce0d40045c10a01
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x112D9 5364 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000124fe.bin
fbf1ec1ec641d9287427afb49497f1beb79d39a74e6ead2ee528695882432dd2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x124FE 12308 bytes