Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 18609ead5a8f765c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.6 KB Created: 2020-04-25 03:49:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: cca4acd6a5bab6443d0fc7571d83fd65 SHA-1: 4a9b04aa34452cf2ae15c6aed26365ad2c7e2c23 SHA-256: 18609ead5a8f765c07bb1c748f130a271a283e60ddaababa5c3f7b3989e5f9a9
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, indicating a link farm strategy. The ML classifier strongly suggests maliciousness, and the PDF structure is indicative of SEO manipulation or hosting malicious content. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of numerous external URLs points towards a potential download or redirection mechanism, possibly involving JavaScript.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://andmerchant.org/uploads/1/3/0/6/130603756/130603756.html#java+swing+components
    • http://youversusyourself.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637830/morunegujet.pdf
    • http://federicaitaliano.it/uploads/1/3/0/3/130313500/0f519a359158c8.pdf
    • http://azurewomensapparel.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384559/fepada.pdf
    • http://commercialairductscleaning.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776591/2663956.pdf
    • http://pilladoporlaesgrima.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130292104/03dbb0921.pdf
    • http://yowinediary.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969162/wefagexobugoto.pdf
    • http://btobasics.nl/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438008/muleteseva-niribezedefes-jerovolakaf.pdf
    • http://lismariestrick.ch/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483508/7294889.pdf
    • http://chefjasontilmann.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383839/wixegogaxerumeniwane.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008747.bin
5c80afc85416eb6cf161c5b21b7ac8418a5c47d7f17bbb418c1053844b25d791		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8747 9368 bytes

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