Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1855630cf9d2fc68…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

135.7 KB Created: 2021-04-28 13:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 200dafe1819ed68933ba25435158368e SHA-1: 3baa7b0c38559457b9803a3b3dd50352ac23b90a SHA-256: 1855630cf9d2fc68b702b6c2009741ba9855bbccfbd867ffeacb808625339a70
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a Microsoft Word document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate a high likelihood of exploitation for CVE-2018-0798, which allows for arbitrary code execution. No specific malware family could be identified, and no further IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
b3ac5dfd3b427ff23c56931d0fcf80dab7a6e4031549f58dd7be93e7fdccc091		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4096 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
17a09905541194d66d39d38526a3afc18fe57190c21e7c6f6985ba2917a15d42		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: olE10naTIvE 1858 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.