Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 184094121e7f85f2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

164.3 KB Created: 2021-01-05 07:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 921b1a68771a8814332e817be85a38f6 SHA-1: b6ba5ecf65d9ffe300556a597cbdcb99850743bf SHA-256: 184094121e7f85f28812ea9fef22dd1cb20c0a75183f8cc057d7b905b5bc220f
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document containing heavily obfuscated VBA macros. The macros utilize `CreateObject` to interact with the file system, creating files such as 'RscCHAX:\UQvUGOTC\RdisBAB.cwXobF' and 'PQnXau:\cdLsv\YicJPFQ.ClKuyu' and writing arbitrary strings to them. This behavior strongly suggests the intent to download and execute a second-stage payload, characteristic of downloader malware.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
a19bea0b68e66c642d89ca357193de473f2db600ca0ce526dc79ce8aaabe41a9
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10612 bytes