Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 183f6c9cdf49b577…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

165.1 KB Created: 2021-01-05 10:15:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: cff8eb932e2015036665d373aa3ce607 SHA-1: f23a23427b0d7f68fe9851340482f0005dc95ee4 SHA-256: 183f6c9cdf49b5774fb704d9740e1cb08a6c9449951f1e7bc8a50bb92f55e813
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 90%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a heavily obfuscated VBA macro that executes upon opening the document. This macro utilizes CreateObject to instantiate a FileSystemObject, which is then used to create and write arbitrary content to files on disk at specific paths. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0' strongly suggests the Emotet family, known for its downloader capabilities.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8c4d881ce710c5bdc93f3892d458c04d696e3b291027b95b98b9ccba700a5f56
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10716 bytes