Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 18233f7f4dfbd401…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.0 KB Created: 2020-06-12 02:13:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 2cbb1c1a1a785e8faac354f70b5757c7 SHA-1: 0b2054eed0e21f474350c8d02cc99be94e39c474 SHA-256: 18233f7f4dfbd4018a6001d622ac5154bd637c9001fde3e226b5dde7310e6e8b
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of external links, many of which point to other PDF files hosted on various domains. The heuristic 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' indicates this is likely a link farm designed to manipulate search engine rankings. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are also present in the extracted URL list. No scripts were extracted from this sample, but the presence of numerous external links suggests a potential for redirection to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://eq3aruba.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163774/131163774.html#pdf+human+anatomy
    • http://mlyterdogstudio.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130551920/6553556.pdf
    • http://judahglobalsolutions.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323295/6993293.pdf
    • http://zeus-athletics.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588847/zurufozuj.pdf
    • http://beneficialskinandbodycare.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871554/jabodumozutedejak.pdf
    • http://dumphimforme.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639307/ea3e84.pdf
    • http://definedbywater.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874683/sowunuw.pdf
    • http://designbyowner.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407459/tesamavirab.pdf
    • http://sadames.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739140/5592441.pdf
    • http://naderafzalan.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620760/mezapanejise.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://woxoravi443393035.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/topun.pdf
    • https://navofifur.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fumajabipum.pdf
    • https://komogepu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/91214231107.pdf
    • https://xojusapa.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/penaxesusuvexiterikarugip.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006385.bin
3a3fb91e10017659cda741a5a68c204d5202d9d7444134e0268e5362fbbb8a47		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6385 20004 bytes

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