Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 180a4564ce82447e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.22 MB
MD5: 51fbad0bcc44f495e09b64ee2f6e542e SHA-1: 8a0bc79271a4cef5d9d2e5c77b15a68f869ebc8a SHA-256: 180a4564ce82447e45e75b149c9a0ac9c87ecbbd77f603a7ec690b8a273f23c1
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is an encrypted OOXML document containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, which is a known carrier for exploits. The 'OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY' heuristic indicates that this object contains a payload-like stream, suggesting it's designed to execute malicious code. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature as a downloader.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.af2fa5c5d0587870-9978799-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.af2fa5c5d0587870-9978799-0
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.