Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 17f0fc72c7dcd56b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

58.0 KB
MD5: dd908a2aaa73b124f026c71e71333070 SHA-1: 2b8322b465177a17f6c379c50346341c91a6818b SHA-256: 17f0fc72c7dcd56bba3d97324542ecefea6add3ba3b5753885cd39b561447742
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploiting Microsoft Equation Editor, including OLE object data and automatic linking, which are known to be used for delivering malicious payloads. The heuristics suggest a critical vulnerability related to Equation Editor, likely leading to the execution of a secondary payload. While no specific script or URL was directly extracted, the nature of the exploit points towards a downloader or dropper.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001610.bin
48baa5553037026ae064f7e3f7b728c3412d3c53268a749fc65334078ccaedea
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1610 1772 bytes