Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 17d4763a682da195…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

123.5 KB Created: 2020-01-30 11:22:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 29a92a66d3e48419dc428db9d7cf349e SHA-1: 47accf7fb58bdbe3d35b6826ec11fc6d67e31c16 SHA-256: 17d4763a682da195eb992eb261656c2d6254f3f8dfc7dc0d92b7ae84e274232b
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The presence of a Document_Open macro and the 'GetObject' call indicate that the macro is designed to execute automatically upon opening. The VBA code is heavily obfuscated, but the ClamAV detection 'Doc.Downloader.Mrwx-7570416-0' suggests its purpose is to download and execute a secondary payload. The embedded URL is not directly actionable due to obfuscation and lack of specific indicators.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Mrwx-7570416-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Mrwx-7570416-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
3e00c7c58b0bef0db091eaa9612f6f818e8a76280ea31c6bb9cf3be71721dc73		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5666 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
d52658d788db5c6e2034181a5c0472547a50b75b9df5556dd872103e6802f03a		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 42496 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Mrwx-7570416-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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