Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 17869646939f2d80…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.1 KB Created: 2020-07-31 14:04:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-07
MD5: 1c6373a42669b10cf57bac0d098d59c8 SHA-1: fc1d8326901d74dfa0885d219f3401e490a20a36 SHA-256: 17869646939f2d80944d3c42835b268def54e3547af0f993531b64eae1a1a6af
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious redirection and a link farm, specifically pointing to a redirector URL that is known to be malicious. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to a 'California fire permit'. The presence of numerous embedded links, many leading to Shopify domains hosting PDFs, further supports the SEO link farm or phishing pretext.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=california+fire+permit+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.kansascityamprepair.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695865/b89f1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.swindonheritageblueplaques.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874587/1461531.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thegoddessloft.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637178/424420a159c11.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.notjustwire.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398140/b7d488ef3ea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.casaesperanzalongmont.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383297/valom_nivofumatis_wumegujapiwim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1753/3597/files/xalutu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8581/6218/files/renowunozoxemuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2111/5298/files/56423383296.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6212/2903/files/disetivazusuwazogapukepuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7584/5792/files/lawojatowinefekaruma.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4848/5535/files/dujebokiwovejubuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8284/1250/files/93684959698.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9291/8937/files/bebovemelawoku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6761/3089/files/daribobanelop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6888/3097/files/nelabagemivi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1125/2132/files/zunakeras.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2683/3823/files/30423780886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/89120948070.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign: stmarks-benson.com 6 samples

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007b17.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B17 4820 bytes
SHA-256: eeca798d0b90227c97a1508c967d273e692df0adb6c4804d9bda67dd07cda117
font_01_sfnt_off00008b5d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8B5D 10484 bytes
SHA-256: 1941607941c91157136716b6699060942fdcd30ebff878ef828693ad27c4d184