Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1778d1f34bfe1073…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

22.5 KB Created: 2024-10-30 00:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 5e03e3550fb907b171a10ca10af8d686 SHA-1: 5b952b0b7b34703a5a6a264097427a848d400bbc SHA-256: 1778d1f34bfe1073f5ce01d250c87aded21c6e2c7fdc7464a427c3c6033faa55
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1071.001 Web Protocols

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The Document_Open macro executes a Shell() call, which references PowerShell and attempts to establish a reverse shell connection to the hardcoded IP address 162.216.149.32 on port 80. This indicates the document's primary purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10002559-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10002559-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f9f3eb3f8e3fc7c6f868ba30b07bcb5a9e5e1a3cc6c32b2d5737815650aaa1f3
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6152 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
e7db399625bb63f9c9a77bfd3687f0c43f97af6b19aa322ce2fe369a9eba3cad
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 23040 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10002559-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely