Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1773c45dbd7f5b91…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

1001.0 KB Created: 2013-06-13 08:19:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2015-09-15
MD5: 0426d5b80fbe85dfbd38a272c464f5f0 SHA-1: bc1802dc647351fdc4d704174d15d52a6ec66774 SHA-256: 1773c45dbd7f5b913c9298c19de13ab0ce5b16a56e6bcefc724f8706bc6fa75a
146 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an embedded OLE object that is identified as a script dropper. This package payload is designed to download and execute a file named 'AdobeReader.exe'. The embedded object also contains URLs that are likely used for the download. The document body suggests the user save the document to their computer, which is a common lure for malicious attachments.

Heuristics 6

  • Ole10Native package payload is a download-and-execute script critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_SCRIPT_DROPPER
    The OLE Package's embedded payload contains a script that hosts a shell (PowerShell/WScript/mshta), fetches a remote resource, and executes it — a download-and-run dropper. Embedding such a script inside an Office document via the Object Packager is a direct user-execution delivery technique (MITRE T1204.002), not a benign attachment.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (5 URLs) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.thawte.com0 Embedded OLE package script
    • http://ts-ocsp.ws.symantec.com07Embedded OLE package script
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://crl.thawte.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0Embedded OLE package script
    • http://ts-aia.ws.symantec.com/tss-ca-g2.cer0Embedded OLE package script
    • http://ts-crl.ws.symantec.com/tss-ca-g2.crl0Embedded OLE package script
    • http://ts-crl.ws.symantec.com/tss-ca-g2.crl0(In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 853504 bytes
SHA-256: c46d87b3cbd6cfdce8fc96e5a6353fe1f244fc8630c4a337263e6ebc7c19fe92
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.86, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 843821 bytes
SHA-256: 0d626c3bd9a9807c3a6ad4f3beda13badd5a397d5d3a861689a9168101808511
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.88, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5164 bytes
SHA-256: eb0402ddf0f0b96eb09cc93622be8ff07d9642d17f815185ad215709487913ce