Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOCX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 175e4bbabdde9ab1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

167.4 KB Created: 2021-01-05 17:50:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: e73b04e845198c131829d7216696b5b0 SHA-1: 6ff22a4be10e52702de7f37305e457d275ba34e6 SHA-256: 175e4bbabdde9ab182f1a1fd05d8555266e32bdb390194288954124afaff6190
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a critical heuristic for an obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader, specifically a Document_Open macro that uses CreateObject and execution sinks. The VBA script attempts to create two files, 'sBFJHmWJ.ByrvyNXI' and 'CbWlODM.ssogG', in arbitrary paths on the local system using 'Scripting.FileSystemObject'. This indicates the macro's intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4ad47f06387c2fe26b40af7c5c3febabd490580f16728c81acf291150b2fb0bb		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10757 bytes

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