Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 175d127ab00bc7cb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

61.7 KB Created: 2020-10-02 18:44:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: 3fe4d1ec5e88295d913b6db946328a59 SHA-1: 72c6a03b979d513d9025e2a97643d93c5f2a6704 SHA-256: 175d127ab00bc7cb834ff05221e036c5868e88169913c7ce277544811e2622a4
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=cape+communication+studies+syllabus+2020+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://fabakel.campwightman.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683438/2019562113e1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zuwisu.learningoutside.org/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303124/66f9ff32.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://budedab.homegrownremediesllc.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740948/samabobipoder.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mirutiwi.robertleebaptistchurch.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776433/0ef4a2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://juxavini.owl-valley.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453540/d14fea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bunor.littlefeetchildcarecenterkatonahny.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857252/girisevewazilen_tisivabajivati.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://runefido.mpcaa.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380600/9575024.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.yoanstudio.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775286/3777489.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037276.mozfiles.com/files/1037276/tapon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037276.mozfiles.com/files/1037276/26431712623.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036939.mozfiles.com/files/1036939/51026989020.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038765.mozfiles.com/files/1038765/10537748670.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036772.mozfiles.com/files/1036772/bazasemoduzomusenivo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8bdd9ccb-00b2-4ed3-80f5-6238aad23836/59508013179.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b1154712-ca5d-4736-ba8e-9f04a75f1266/8535497386.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5f29dc00-e324-4aea-af88-d7fdf0a295a8/rifajezo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/865ae2de-dd92-4d6a-8005-100cedc5817f/42830835359.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d9486f2d-a392-4be5-88dd-d3d84dc87f01/favobutewalavunowaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b17a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB17A 5624 bytes
SHA-256: f6eda002e68d06228120913aa7a3b0a8c167fecd3fa4c8b4938682c5360fe64f
font_01_sfnt_off0000c48a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC48A 10752 bytes
SHA-256: e5ef29c7185426b015f4cb1fb30069989cdd84e7a51a68745a7411f75377cc40

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.