Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 175ce71c7100ec4a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.3 KB Created: 2021-02-14 13:05:47 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-10
MD5: 2ad000cec315676e845c1817e33c3b48 SHA-1: dc94d2b5b1fd9b27c6fa84c31012458eba0eb4a0 SHA-256: 175ce71c7100ec4aec0a26c627a42b2230c089401a2c4e20dd3d21c38afd31f7
286 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://druttle.ru/aws?utm_term=can+you+get+android+messages+on+macbook PDF link annotation
    • https://povemiloten.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134608376/7766122.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wesebewoweva/Xjf9xBK/69312397210.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vojufeluwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681665/3018511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tigidejuremu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134502839/kobuxivije-nobuxujalib-liwug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4476010/normal_6028ef01e334f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4414871/normal_5fcc8d8247a05.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fedugaxoloz/0Qr9big/ringtones_melody_songs_telugu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zifujujefilat.iblogger.org/65273764947.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xebazasasixuj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134641459/2929347.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bilanogakiw/idygdja/mortal_kombat_2_original_characters.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gukugifixija/ibFjfig/checkers_2_for_4_deal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://jizozekawa.epizy.com/anger_management_techniques.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pivetuzadujo/low_voltage_regulator_using_ic_723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gomaxod/56148849971.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/muwomapotumugi/kdoqi_dialysis_guidelines.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cd46.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCD46 5436 bytes
SHA-256: 09ec5ac3b13fa04424e25a18e782c4c75ae373aced8bc5f10d3f6e237c06dee9
font_01_sfnt_off0000dfba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDFBA 10760 bytes
SHA-256: c276ab932fa89d05b5bd4e3fc0b47bfac100a5024a2669a91be917b8c855abb7

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