Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1755de99e2d3cef8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.2 KB Created: 2021-06-23 17:42:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: cb82be4dff38a668d42048d83e7e2294 SHA-1: 9f3c50455061df5780b618c77be68f699388559a SHA-256: 1755de99e2d3cef8a2a16caa3d5fdf713a394c692131d1be14c2a39be89b4714
276 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF document employs social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, to trick users into executing commands. The document instructs the user to copy and paste content into a terminal, which is a common method for downloading and executing second-stage payloads. The presence of multiple URLs pointing to potentially compromised or disposable hosting further supports this malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://synerhu.ru/uplcv?utm_term=windows+10+free+activation+cmd PDF link annotation
    • https://stagerightstaging.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9bd3d0fb1e7bb20c980141fe4b27d45d/43528753601.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://reifenscho.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc33f17ddc---bafitavimafowoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jagatjyotischool.org/jagatjyotischool/userfiles/file/tanonutisovagekutujol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ankaser.com/userfiles/file/55300278681.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lasanisports.com/files/kikataruwokisanaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aire-limpio.com/img/editor/file/12913489027.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webhostmurah.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc5fe82112---831232261.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://brooklinehs1964.com/clients/6/6a/6a3559cec3eb17f551da2d864c8c85ab/File/wawalepobezuted.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lookupagency.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a52fbc10f91---2826078727.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.lbf-cosmetics.com/website/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f39ed46637---94137460368.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://willtorock.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608fdeb5dcc8b---tuwozapojunijufimeniga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lawina-radom.pl/files/file/67740006975.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://traonguoc.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/66bgpnus59ifcqppi118ec7c6g/nozewez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://petroblend.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c666ca4514---fejaluf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://allprintusa.com/admin/images/file/gemurufusesap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stagerightstaging.com/wp-content/plugins/super-fIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ece7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECE7 5492 bytes
SHA-256: a86bb126badbbd77055d1ff34001a599e3f9561ebc64fe222adefcb172f5e438
font_01_sfnt_off0000ffa8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFFA8 11680 bytes
SHA-256: 9e62493f8b749d244ac0908606cc8f866454e66eeceec135a95f86a6fd54bc66