Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1754bc8d6b04b895…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

261.5 KB Created: 2022-07-05 06:05:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-07-05
MD5: c6e6209a71fbc0ccc65315231ee2b257 SHA-1: 1f9ea21aaf0c9d90bdff5d23a1813ee2fbc11318 SHA-256: 1754bc8d6b04b89533b44e3ab94b0cf41897a948b6ea3e7c1292d4cd0da71e1f
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The document contains an embedded OLE object which is flagged as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. This indicates the document is likely a malicious attachment designed to deliver a secondary payload. The presence of embedded artifacts like 'ooxml_oleobject_00.bin' and 'ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin' further supports this finding.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
bee334513401c29c0601d5db40dd4c8f324c21e3a8e7312b7ee8be566a4592e9
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 240128 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
cb3f88a64f97f39f7dbd1d697be4c6e2c4d685eba1c98c0f1f365427b70d9e0a
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 235297 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
080692be3844306b0d1dbea12fefaefcdb89c1aa6f42ba64a2173f0674cc518a
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes