Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 173971890f17ba2f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

29.8 KB First seen: 2022-12-20
MD5: ff9e415badd980df76fe833ed9f99ea5 SHA-1: 0b7c4d7834bbc6644a52dc059f2ab97a7a6d35f0 SHA-256: 173971890f17ba2ff7ed6eb243a45d106fbec0e755188957b285e6045677ffb3
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known technique for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which would activate the OLE object and likely trigger the exploit. No specific malware family is identifiable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005666.bin
d3f135a8fca02e2de34fa6119f95d6e2a98cb9bd3a089e81c4d60fc3c342bd0b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5666 1864 bytes