MALICIOUS
362
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
The sample contains an obfuscated VBA loader within a Workbook_Open macro, designed to execute a second-stage payload. The script reconstructs a list of 11 URLs, indicating an intent to download and run malicious content from external sources. The presence of CreateObject and Shell execution tokens strongly suggests the execution of downloaded malware.
Heuristics 9
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Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
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URL reconstructed from VBA cell-staged base64 dropper (11 URLs) critical OLE_VBA_CELL_DROPPER_URLVBA reads worksheet cells, strips junk substrings via Replace(), and base64/UTF-16 decodes the result into a PowerShell EncodedCommand payload. The download URL is never contiguous in the file bytes; it was recovered by removing the macro's Replace() junk tokens from the cell strings and decoding the staged base64.
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02220-9938909-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02220-9938909-0
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Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPTReference to Windows Script Host
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Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPENWorkbook_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://harperhouseproducts.com/Merchant2/ARsf1LIcOauhH1rDrIh/
- http://holubvideo.com/eln-images/zqqgZ0YXaPiWbF/
- http://chastongroditski.com/eln-images/skSsC
- http://seacupps.com/eln-images/AYvykzg/
- http://ericandrobin.com/cgi/qRe8dRaG2HDNOOG1/
- http://sosantiques.com/cgi/9ii/
- https://greenlawnirrigation.net/GLI_New/JRlt3mOiezE/
- https://on-lineventures.com/cgi/ks0Mp/
- http://blog.logo123.com/wp-content/19G04LjA1UcE1tN8/
- http://magicblog.tatamotors.com/wp-includes/7faN9/
- http://intrablog.tatamotors.com/wp-includes/MGGi5zcZrkolFH9/
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.basde7bcbc45ff0a77d05d9af662bacc316e71be11a980e94f6673e556a5dd9d1bc |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 12808 bytes |
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