Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1711a23529d3557f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

168.7 KB Created: 2021-01-05 06:14:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: d2bee9c25a8345cb57e46132c652adad SHA-1: 6b84502c5d9c294f5a483d8b654caa903bf8f96b SHA-256: 1711a23529d3557fb1824e6e0ee2ba2fa88d68966eeaae5ca265c2be636b7204
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that is heavily obfuscated and uses CreateObject to instantiate a FileSystemObject. This object is then used to create two files, 'gMEpHB:\SKWvYCA\YtZqA.fQoAE' and 'ehLoAm:\PAVZiAGU\jVPHv.fAgoFBYmC', with arbitrary content. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0' strongly suggests Emotet family involvement, which commonly uses such downloaders.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e6cbaf609dbac192156d45839b7ee0912b890e835217bd9fcd38a1509f7c92fb
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10713 bytes