Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1709bb50f3d76ef5…

MALICIOUS

RTF

40.4 KB First seen: 2023-07-18
MD5: 3f5e1041a772ab1286cfe8fa8adc136d SHA-1: a7bd3f8edcc840719a16055637871c65e8194d34 SHA-256: 1709bb50f3d76ef58a47f8b4af7aeff626029e01ab0cbe53936cfe1a79525c54
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this object, which is a common technique for executing malicious code. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', further supporting its role as a malicious dropper.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004b9e.bin
fa0b70c142c3721ece34d5e8b528f07f477c246b4ec751e553903cc9ff678bda
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4B9E 1600 bytes