Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 170118e138a5228f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.2 KB Created: 2020-10-16 18:10:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 6ac4bd7103f6b4e957e608b003296b00 SHA-1: 60605faeb4df67313099184b3c4509041c1f124a SHA-256: 170118e138a5228f6fb88d6a773eb5f48b6984338a7ede7856f0eb06ddc6c1d1
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains and a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The primary purpose appears to be SEO manipulation and directing users to potentially harmful content, rather than direct execution of malware from within the PDF itself.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=the+grand+grimoire+pdf+em+portugues In PDF document text
    • https://genigudepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070712/8061633.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/36ce75ac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ridolagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775195/rumemitamexikajiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366007/normal_5f88d9c17e0e3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365600/normal_5f89247143496.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367007/normal_5f8743ab13b0c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367000/normal_5f873067ca520.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366055/normal_5f88f11c5970e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368478/normal_5f8820e636f18.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370547/normal_5f88a4a734641.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuxozajuje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379873/bewoti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kurikezexiwu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775092/8940204.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojenosude.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382274/cb7f3b7698.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fupexorugukemig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814763/cb248828b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/belapigojat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0494/1067/0759/files/54622409651.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/1832/8991/files/pagixu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0492/6144/5276/files/another_word_for_conquer_crossword_clue.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0476/7937/3478/files/new_orleans_to_baton_rouge_greyhound.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1612/6625/files/jadivunen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000065c1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x65C1 5372 bytes
SHA-256: 1459804a6d968cc693b58becb5792360ad1fe2e8339e987e20ff20d5be6d5298
font_01_sfnt_off000077da.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x77DA 10444 bytes
SHA-256: 4bdfcc0c2d96e66daaf1c94604722538e5a677eee1e29cb53c2e5c5e4eed2c3e

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