Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16ea9412ac0f734d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

205.8 KB Created: 2022-08-05 07:54:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-08
MD5: 77b227146d232d02253ba37f593b2d10 SHA-1: 52d36e932dd1a172f19560ff2511cf054f8ba2b9 SHA-256: 16ea9412ac0f734ddf9656a4f028dcbbb0ad052dabb57708f98567da64819e7f
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE package is designed to drop an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. The embedded artifact analysis confirms the presence of OLE objects and related files, suggesting a dropper functionality.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
b9070b8fc7742071bd562b151be0c05bc8e0c482689db37868e5ab3d7c19afa8		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 170496 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
a7465658c91e8e08cb86df51d4b955820769cc214883ec49fe86cfd942035f11		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 166156 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
22f547e7b1e8e7372a59fa86142ff28b5e485caa7261de785d5ee36f1d4c0b9f		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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