Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16e8376269d4eed0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

30.0 KB First seen: 2022-08-02
MD5: 3a8485b2006f215e918a90bf73a81230 SHA-1: d4289d4c02bb52ef4de99eb2b8f5c92a5b669272 SHA-256: 16e8376269d4eed099f5b9b5c7bfd7575c0d52947d16387ae7f2d44f7d23e3ae
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an encrypted Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability for remote code execution. The exploit carrier is an embedded OLE object that attempts to download a secondary DOCX file from the provided URL. The document body is encrypted, preventing further analysis of its content, but the heuristic firings strongly indicate a malicious downloader.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://wwwarglobalincinte.sytes.net/swiss/trn7/trn7.docx?&tanzania=tenuous&veal=goofy&vase=icy&france=quick&path

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