Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16e3975ce5694eea…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

173.5 KB Created: 2006-08-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: fe07354d68e85a995ba2ec8691162020 SHA-1: 1df59137290f0bf31a035e0c40f9d56eeddb29bd SHA-256: 16e3975ce5694eeaf84f7580c342ace5b38806f831018e6bd70740ca67fb1b6f
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a PowerPoint file containing obfuscated VBA macros. The Auto_Close macro is triggered upon closing the document, which then uses the Shell() function to execute a downloaded payload from the URL 'http://1230948%1230948@j.mp/jasfkaosdkokllplplsdakojjjj'. The obfuscated nature and the use of Shell() indicate a malicious intent to download and run a secondary stage.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://1230948%1230948@j.mp/jasfkaosdkokllplplsdakojjjj

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
45ce1c2bfe16c1b52e4f43380ce44ad84ec8ec31d4ca05d58d18d34d0f9bd321
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 40735 bytes