Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16dc7d87ed96c348…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

58.5 KB
MD5: 46ef1d19df9d618dbc2767f66e8b588f SHA-1: 6812ca4cd99fce3d63d25624b292e581b0d70cd8 SHA-256: 16dc7d87ed96c348fc80e0e3f6967a6f23bdfb440cc883f72b90ec0cda361faa
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OOXML document is designed to exploit a vulnerability in OLE2Link and URL Moniker to load a remote resource. The embedded URL, https://sh4re.be/8915, is likely the source of the secondary payload. The document is encrypted with a default password, a common technique to obscure malicious content.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://sh4re.be/8915

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