Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16cc568d2f7b7c71…

MALICIOUS

RTF

5.2 KB First seen: 2022-09-26
MD5: ac03ef0f1ec77313fd15ac602d06c8bd SHA-1: 141560112543283541e471af19ebb8ade56ae549 SHA-256: 16cc568d2f7b7c7193c183b51383d69840ec0cb9cae4ba931367bd45aaf37b88
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code upon activation, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The specific Equation Editor class 'eQUaTioN.3' was identified.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000007c.bin
6d085e1c5c35d1c8935a3b0dcf71e88cd1949578de05a6ce7f915fc8e54fed52		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7C 2429 bytes

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