Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16cc45380a3805cf…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

224.5 KB Created: 2006-08-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: 548e6891e0c323c257aa12b3fc4a20c4 SHA-1: 7ac4142d39cc8560ed5d4b4124d3509b2c72a9f5 SHA-256: 16cc45380a3805cf4bf2d11651e5791c98ee0b13820c6c7223a56e195ee45c8f
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a PowerPoint file containing heavily obfuscated VBA macros. The Auto_Close macro is designed to execute a command that concatenates strings to form a URL, which is then used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The critical heuristics indicate the use of `Shell()` and character-shift decoding to obfuscate the execution command.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA character-shift decoded Shell command critical OLE_VBA_ASC_CHR_SHIFT_SHELL
    VBA auto-exec macro stores an encoded command string, decodes it with a Mid/Asc/Chr character-shift loop, and passes the recovered text to Shell. This is a high-confidence command stager.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://%8234%8234@j.mp/ddkjaspoqwiokaslkdkw

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7d84f8124840080116c6a5069ba3cfdf2855117f63bb931a88d9a06bd7b1b345
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 47966 bytes