Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16ca87f9d010cac7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.4 KB Created: 2020-08-01 21:46:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 59e698face66ce37509343425fd5eb38 SHA-1: bcf6aed88c09ff075ffd7fb044abab66c2937c1e SHA-256: 16ca87f9d010cac708457c85747ddf0cf47b904618c6cd530976d84af12474cb
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a social engineering lure ('Open pdf in paint') and multiple embedded URLs, one of which points to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command, a common tactic to bypass macro restrictions and execute a secondary payload. The presence of numerous links, including a link farm, suggests an attempt to distribute malicious content or engage in SEO manipulation for malicious purposes.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=open+pdf+in+paint
    • http://files.fun-tasticfoxes.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680931/zodisajutizik.pdf
    • http://files.spiritualresearchnetwork.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874642/4515940.pdf
    • http://files.elephantroomgallery.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380480/mabifazimenukowu.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2022/1607/files/17971999548.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8631/5682/files/60073776401.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7373/2768/files/58741690678.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3405/7621/files/lomomobagogutosotamavixa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9656/4131/files/29233034625.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8535/7463/files/97889950460.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4489/6917/files/koxoxipawomimujejen.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5216/2462/files/dirudexigetekanakuvozebo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5627/5360/files/26928454977.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3443/4969/files/16480574712.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006ef6.bin
1c550e0493595dab3130afc78d68d87a594f28170afd683bf526c1e0b008bb66		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EF6 4756 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007f3b.bin
243ae1eba581d39959ee9aa2bbf7dac1d29f7bf9f72fd4d96ce0fa38561fd673		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F3B 10712 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a3fd.bin
2ec7b87bc56cc33d32d243ecb23d136f13b6601874843951a4ee16d7972f48d9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA3FD 16116 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.