Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16c02cc42cc1ce61…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.6 KB Created: 2020-11-08 02:49:36 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: c49d3b51449b7decc62ce3b78e05f7e2 SHA-1: c18781b03afe43fc2b4ea6e69f8ffe0967574a4c SHA-256: 16c02cc42cc1ce61233444d6d5a745a75bf496c6f761cb5745e86baf605afeab
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded links, one of which points to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text that appears to be a lure for a shredder manual, likely to entice users to click the malicious link. The presence of numerous other PDF links suggests a link farm used for SEO poisoning or to distribute further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?keyword=royal+1650mx+shredder+manual In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://fodabijiwifi.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/wadorenizagonuvavufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/48d17911-db6e-4544-9017-dba6040a7f35/zepumi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fb21b448-9691-4f54-9917-d1ba2f6f00f7/vofiwaronagusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2365d040-2c49-40bd-9288-cac96e283c8f/vipakosojijudes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pefukiketez.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/tournament_of_power_eliminations.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/39fda77c-7517-4d76-9e9e-429a3759ff26/4141793839.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kegatametol.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/loksatta_epaper_mumbai.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f9f9dd57-bd55-4198-8a9f-de3db5b60733/51172129898.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zatejoru847961968.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/72489844693.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zipexazoti.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/mikolatudod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xoxedoxiki.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/till_death_do_us_part_witcher_3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wotenopofe.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/budixaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pokagiriti.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/charlotte_princess_and_the_frog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/143d07e9-7172-48dc-acd2-7a6e1ff4b464/2127275632.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000815a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x815A 5712 bytes
SHA-256: 48aff1b19a4040f9c6e3e9b989152a6f45d0dc02ee82fde3ae48e846ddf72ed8
font_01_sfnt_off000094b4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x94B4 10772 bytes
SHA-256: 1be15e34fdb37fd174fa5819fe17fcffc9366c043c3420eabf58b1806ec4f612

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.