Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 16b355e9abafe156…

MALICIOUS

RTF

25.6 KB First seen: 2023-06-01
MD5: 8504482b2c616c2052d6ed9656344162 SHA-1: 062ad4e51a0688441f81e829a4ddc1e0363046f9 SHA-256: 16b355e9abafe1569e7a68abf79adcf89267c3968819743dc3963c31aa5de245
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the CVE-2017-11882 Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to deliver a second-stage payload. The high entropy of the decoded OLE object suggests it contains executable code. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-based document delivery.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001d64.bin
a57c156e13425f6be4fd4411305884cddbe8a4b8a57e4305875afc213ef78eb0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D64 3673 bytes