Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 169cb700a4d8d467…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

176.4 KB Created: 2022-07-27 10:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-07-27
MD5: f13983203dd39fcc814cae8bfe40d776 SHA-1: 506ae87a5d44fd72583a4657daa394c044f85286 SHA-256: 169cb700a4d8d467e715fee7d9d50d58a4c4218fc3fd865ab4e999178501a13e
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as a risky file package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. The presence of this embedded object strongly suggests an attempt to execute a secondary payload upon opening the document, likely as part of a phishing attack.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
cb8a404d68fd9a3fa6233c9744d1336a6833fc82e480a6d1e9f0b23b441470e6		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 153088 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.95, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
69679e445cf8d92b4c51bd08eb29dda30863ac11649eb477c1ac1674467e1a20		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 148648 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
d0138ee82670a4f88a92d9f6aeca02f3fa926a746e8a0a40c31100cfc582d482		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes

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