Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 168d41d251918156

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.59 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-27

MD5: 0e0db6a191124208a1261923dc237ab3 SHA-1: 7369c5a629c680815508a59cab200d00f4e531c9 SHA-256: 168d41d251918156588cd3b72dc62c03a61f0ef69a2d8562e910c2603edd373c

150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This is further supported by the presence of an OLE Equation Editor object. The VBA macros do not contain executable statements, suggesting the exploit is directly embedded within the OLE object.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR

Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP) high SC_GETPC_CALL

x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP)
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`ole10native_00.bin` `bfe2b7bb8b32f13c36c0c2b7e8dd00acc71a0e9e7c312a5fb093fd2fd113d740`	ole-package	OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0201BF38/olE10NativE	1574 bytes

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