Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 167071b24d90f525…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.3 KB Created: 2020-08-28 01:21:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 1c5bc89198466425a8685ecc3dd18484 SHA-1: 2fd8edb6ae358926138069e82b14c948815abbe2 SHA-256: 167071b24d90f525fd04ececbdde88b24143eac4e1dee2444223aa5b33513cf3
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious infrastructure. One critical heuristic identified a link to a known malicious redirector, ttraff.com. The document body contains obfuscated text and URLs, suggesting an attempt to disguise malicious activity. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of numerous links and the ML classifier's high confidence indicate a malicious intent to redirect users to harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=donde+aterrizar+bruno+latour+pdf
    • http://files.kushifarm.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070452/likifanorewi-felowuker-xijenubanobat.pdf
    • http://lopifefot.boudreauxsbbq.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874629/1181744.pdf
    • http://files.curlycaninecare.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695321/wurepof.pdf
    • http://botiluvi.cadillacautorepair.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681393/bujemipizumezid.pdf
    • http://files.vchschool.org/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710732/6796007.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/6347/4331/files/kudemesilulu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/koxumugude.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2093/4558/files/agile_project_management_handbook_v2._0_chomikuj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4796/0232/files/lowes_queensbury_ny.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5841/3216/files/blur_background_camera_app_for_android.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8611/1137/files/92548357986.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/5769/1294/files/jidunax.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4622/4551/files/marketing_activation_plan.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1773/1229/files/kuvezijonegukewonefupada.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8951/1068/files/polskie_radio_1030_am.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/5905/9615/files/zalojuxega.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006193.bin
2f9dcffd760fae4b73580c28c214b5bbeb4cfce36ad5e150abe729bb1fb4dc7f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6193 5048 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000072d1.bin
92539ccac0cc7e38caad39228739e3df94a041e912ed0a1857c7d424ecbfaf4e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72D1 9888 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.